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THE TRUE STORY
Poetic Law and License in
Johnson's Criticism
John L. Mahoney

hile there are many themes, motifs, and strategies in
Johnson's criticism of literature, there are few as rich
or as intriguing as his consistent search for a fidelity
to what he calls truth and to what he sees as its
moraTunplications. Students of Johnson, especially in this century,
each in his or her own way, have been quick to call attention to this
quest. Johnson's law is that of "experienced reality," according to Jean
Hagstrum, the test of the real actions and feelings of men and women.'
W. J. Bate argues: "Certainly Johnson provides a refreshing protest on
behalf of the familiar and of direct human interest."^ Leopold Damrosch contends that the criticism was not written "to furnish a chapter
in the history of ideas," but rather "to tell the truth about poets and
poems.'" And extending his argument to include a more specifically
moral dimension, he describes Johnson as applying to poetry "the same
standards that he applies to writing in general and to life itself...writing

' Jean Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota
Press, 1952), 7.
' W. Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1968), 185.
' Leopold Damrosch, The Uses of Johnson's Criticism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press. 1976), 5
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instructs, poetry instructs by pleasing.Paul Fussell writes tersely: "To
the very end he remains faithful to his root conception of writing as an
elucidation of general human nature."^ And most recently Lawrence
Lipking, viewing Johnson as a Christian Moralist, argues that he
substitutes "for one's own individual vision, the collective wisdom of
mankind or the eye of the All-Seeing."^
Yet, against this somewhat austere backdrop, we are advised that
any attempt to paint Johnson as reactionary or to point to an unbend
ing essentialism or an ignoring of important aspects of history, class,
and gender may not bear as close scrutiny as one would think. And
while his concerns for what he describes as the "common reader" are
clear indicators of his respect for law, his flexibility in interpreting and
applying law is an equally clear sign of his tolerance, indeed approval
of a certain enlightened freedom and license. Again the present writer
makes no claim to any unusual insight on this coimt.
Roger Shackleton makes the point nicely when he grants that
"Johnson carried into the second half of the century the outlook, the
ideas, and the sympathies of the earliest representatives of the Enlight
enment." Yet, hecontinues, "to have aligned himself, in the public view
or in the light of his own conscience, with the philosophes of 1770,
atheists and materialists as they were, would for him have been
unthinkable."^ And Damrosch reminds us of Johnson's warning that
readers should be "deeply suspicious of any criticism that ignores our
response."® Then there is Lawrence Lipking's point that although he
regards Johnson as basically a Lockean, "empiricist philosophers
content themselves with describing mankind as it is, not as it ought to
be. But Christians assume the duty of superimposing on the human
image the image of a greater man, one not worthy of the creator in
whose image we are made. That is why we are given imaginations: to
imagine someone better than we are.'" Viewing the criticism from still
' Damrosch, 22.
' Paul Fussell, SamuelJohnson and the Life of Writing (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1971), 278.
' Lawrence Lipking, "What was It Like to Be Johnson?" in The Age of Johnson; A Scholarly
Annual, ed. Paul J. Korshin (New York: AMS Press, 1995) 37-38.
' Roger Shackleton, "Johnson and the Enlightenment," in Johnson, Boswell and Their Circle;
Essays Presented to Lawrence Fitzroy Powell in Honor of His Eighty-Fourth Birthday, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965), 92.
' Damrosch, 222.
' Lipking, 53.
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another angle, Kevin Cope offers an image of Johnson in search of a
"moral system which is not too systematic to apply to daily life" and in
the process calling up "two terms, 'rational hope' and 'rational
benevolence' and one metaphor-rich model of experience, that of the
world as economic system."^" Bate seems close to the mark with his
citation of Johnson's axiom "There is always an appeal open from
criticism to nature" and his claim that this axiom is "at the heart of all
his critical writing.""
It is a wonderfully provocative blending and interaction of two
critical postures—law and license, empirical and imaginative, rational
and emotional—that give Johnson's criticism of poetry vitality and
timeliness, that often creates a kind of unpredictability in his judg
ments, and that makes him, as Eliot put it, "a dangerous person to
disagree with."'^ This essay may offer little that is startlingly new to
Johnsonians, yet may serve as a testing-ground, may dramatize—using
a selection of texts—the thesis that Johnson's final estimate of a work
of art is rooted in the extent to which law and license are in conflict or
accord, the degree to which, for example, the imaginative and emo
tional serve the larger purpose of what we will—of what perhaps he
would—call the true and the moral.
This somewhat lengthy introduction—perhaps—should,
as already suggested, have a familiar ring for Johnsonains. After all,
words like "truth," "true," "imitation," "moral," "religious," "virtue,"
"justice," and the like appear often enough not just in the broad
contexts of his writing, but also in his specific critiques of poets and
poetry. Consider, for example, his large and grand—and indeed ear-and
eye-catching—generalizations about what seem like his ultimate literary
values. The often-quoted "Preface to Shakespeare" comes to mind
immediately, especially the kind of foundation principles set down
early in that document, before any positive or negative comments
about Shakespeare's plays. "Nothing can please many, and please long,
but just representations of general nature....The irregular combinations
of fanciful invention may delight a-while...but the pleasures of sudden

Kevin Cope, "Rational Hope, Rational Benevolence, and Ethical Accountancy: Johnson and
Swift on the Economy of Happiness," in Korshin, 187.
" Bate, 181.
T. S. Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets" in Criticism; The Major Texts, ed. Walter Jackson Bate
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 534.
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•wonder are soon exhausted, and the mind can only repose on the
stability of truth."" Then there is Imlac's wide-eyed autobiographical
dissertation on poetry in Rasselas with its sweeping, "To a poet nothing
can be useless....for every idea is useful for the enforcement or decora
tion of moral or religious truth."" "Poets," he writes in The Life of
Waller "indeed, profess fiction, but the legitimate end of fiction is the
conveyance of truth."" And in the Life of Milton he defines poetry as
"the art of uniting pleasure with truth, by calling imagination to the
help of reason."" He responds positively to Pope's Eloisa—more about
this later—because "The heart naturally loves truth."" And he sets
down the duty of a writer in The Life of Savage as to "follow the rules
of virtue, and to preserve an imvaried regard to truth."" All of the
above hardly sounds like the words of a theorist or critic with much of
a tolerance for undecidability or ambiguity or with any strong
penchant for historicizing.
So much for Johnsonian abstractions or proclamations. Highsounding to be sure, legalistic at least on first hearing, but what do they
mean in their contexts, what possible pertinence can they have for
contemporary theoreticians and critics, or perhaps I should say
historians of criticism, attempting to find a modus operandi, or reference
points in an increasingly complex critical climate.^ We might begin by
returning to the point that the core of almost all Johnson's abstractions
is the Lockean concrete. Jean Hagstrum sounded almost too decisive
some forty years ago in his pioneering Samuel Johnson's Literary
Criticism, declaring that "virtually everything that Samuel Johnson said
about the mind indicates firm adherence to the principle that most
human knowledge arises from the closest possible contact with
objective, inescapable, coercive experience," that "Johnson had learned
well the lessons of Locke" and that these lessons "gave firmness and
sanity to his determinations."" William Youngren seems more
" Samuel Johnson,/oteon on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo, vols. 7-8 of The Yale Edition of
the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 7:61-62.
"SixaaelJohnsoTs, Rasselas and Other Tales, ed. Gwin J. Kolb, vol. 16 of The Yale Edition of the
Works of SamuelJohnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 16:42-43.
Samuel Johnson. Livesof theEnglish Poets by SamuelJohnson,2 vols, (Oxford University Press,
1933) 1.194.
" Samuel Johnson, Lives,1:121.
" Samuel Johnson, Lives, 2:333.
'* Samuel Johnson, Lives, 2:125-26.
" Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism, 19.
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temperate but no less straightforward when he contends that "if we are
to understand Johnson on general nature...we must understand that a
loosely held (and no doubt usually unformulated) version of Lockean
empiricism, with its easy assimilation of the intellectual to the sensory"
goes a long way toward helping us understand "why Johnson and his
contemporaries can so easily shuttle back and forth in a way that can
seem so puzzling to us, from praise of generality to praise of particular
ity or even to praise of both."^°
Johnson's law is the law of what Hagstrum calls "experienced
reality"of the real actions and feelings of men and women, and it is the
primary test for King Lear, Desdemona, Adam and Eve, Comus and the
Lady, Eloisa and Abelard, and others. And it is in this sense an
inflexible law not to be subverted by the mythological, the pastoral, the
prelapsarian.^^ Rambler 4 focuses sharply on the "task of our present
writers," a task requiring, of course, "that learning which is to be gained
from books," but also the knowledge that "must arise from general
converse, and accurate observation of the living world." The "common
reader" must be engaged, and this generation of such readers enjoys
fictions that "exhibit life in its true state, diversified only by accidents
that daily happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities
which are really to be found in conversing with mankind.
And
Pope's poetry is admirable because he "gathered his notions fresh from
reality, not from the copies of authors,"" and because his materials
were formed by "minute attention."^''
"General nature" may be what Johnson finds in Shakespeare, but
such a nature, far from some Platonic paradigm, includes "the actions
of men," "the inanimate world," "things as they really exist."^' For
those who read and view Shakespeare's plays—we may, I think,
summon a "common viewer" to accompany the "common
reader"—characters may be species, but they are not stereotypes. They
are only "men, who act and speak as the reader thinks that he should

William Youngren, "Conceptualism and Neoclassic Generality," ELHA7 (1980): 705-740.
Hagstrum, 7.
" Samuel Johnson, The Rambler,eds. Walter Jackson Bate and Albrecht B.Strauss, vols. 3-5 of
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson )New Haven: Yales University Press, 1969),
5:19-20.
"Johnson, Lives, 2:318.
"Johnson, Lives, 2:323.
Johnson on Shakespeare, 7:89
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himself have spoken or acted on the same occasion," "human senti
ments in human languages.
We recall, along with his commendations, certain of Johnson's
more celebrated complaints revolving around the test of truth. Milton's
Lycidas affords him the chance to express his displeasure with pastoral,
but his deeper sense that real passion "runs not after remote allusions
and obscure opinions....Where there is leisure for fiction there is little
grief." After all, Milton hardly knew King; "they never drove a field"
and "had no flocks to batten." And, while he can grant the allegorical,
it must have a purpose, it must strengthen the real subject. In Lycidas,
he argues, "the true meaning is so uncertain and remote, that it is never
sought because it cannot be known when it is found.In a word, it
is not true. The poet has been carried away by a wandering fancy.
And though his admiration for Paradise Lost was great, as we shall recall
shortly, he finds a problem in that the plan of the poem "comprises
neither human actions nor human manners."^® Adam and Eve, "who
act and suffer, are in a state which no other man or woman can ever
know," and hence "the want of human interest is always felt."^' As
Stephen Fix puts it, Johnson in the Life of Milton "will select or manage
evidence so as to shape in our minds an image of Milton as a man
whose interests and concerns are curiously divorced from the common
lives of men in society." Johnson, "the perpetual moralist," he argues,
"found himself with the unnerving task of writing the life of a man
whose works and days seemed to be separated from common humanity
by a wide gulf and whose genius flourished not in spite of that
separation, but because of it."^°
The vagaries of Cowley, Donne, and others of the race of
Metaphysical poets deny them the name of poets. Forgetting Aris
totle's mimesis, "yoking heterogeneous ideas...by violence together,"
"these poets cannot be said to have imitated anything: they neither
copied nature or life."^' And Gray's poetry, with the notable exception
of the Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, turns from the real to the

^ Johnson on Shakespeare,?
^'Johnson, Z.JW5, 1:115.
Johnson, Lives, 1:116.
^'Johnson, £ITOS, 1:130.
Stephen Fix, "Teaching Johnson's Critical Writing," Approaches to Teaching the Works of
Samuel Johnson, ed. David Anderson and Gwin Kolb (New York: MLA, 1993), 130-31.
"Johnson, Liwr, 1:14.
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"poetical." The Bard, in expanding "a singular event...by fabulous
appendages of spectres and predictions," abandons the "probable." Yet
common readers are "affected only as we believe," and such a poem
"promotes" no "truth, moral or political."^^
But, we might say, where does this norm of reality experienced
take him as a practicing critic faced with particular texts which seem
either to challenge theoretical premises or to test the limits of the
empirical? Indeed these are the questions imbedded in so much of
Johnson's most challenging criticism, and their answers in Johnson and
perhaps in the speculations in the next section of this essay, may reveal
how his best work is generated when ideals like art as imitation, the
true story, the moral and religious dimension collide with the claims of
individuality, an exuberant imagination, powerful feeling. No simple
picture will do.
We return to Shakespeare, for Johnson a master in the literary
tradition, yet one whose genius, as Stephen Fix puts it, triggers often a
certain "agitation and extremity" in Johnson's response, whose "virtue
and difficulty is his ability to place readers at emotional extremes,""
whose power, as we might put it, cuts too close to the bone. He is
ready, of course, to deal with license, leaving open always an appeal
from law to the varied and wondrous ways of a capacious nature. Yes,
Shakespeare mixes the classic genres, but, in combining comedy and
tragedy and creating a new interplay, he creates a wider genre that must
be reckoned with, one "exhibiting the real state of sublunary nature,
which partakes of good and evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with endless
variety of proportion and innumerable modes of combination."" And
while he reminds pedantic critics who censure Shakespeare for violating
the Three Unities that Aristotle insisted only on a unity of action, he
still wants a final word about place and time. "The truth is," he says,
"that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first
act to the last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are
only players."'^ Reality must have its day.
Yet Shakespeare, the artist in love with life and its many
manifestations—good and bad—on occasion "sacrifices virtue to

"Johnson, Lives, 2.481-84.
" Fix, 130-31
Johnson on Shakespeare, 7:66-67.
Johnson on Shakespeare, 7-17.
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convenience, and is so much more careful to please than to instruct that
he seems to write without any moral purpose."'^ Damrosch contends
that "Johnson's best criticism is called forth, not by works that he
knows how 'to place' but by those that defy categorizing. Many great
works, for instance, strike him as being aesthetically excellent but
morally neutral—not vicious, so that condemnation is clearly in order,
but in some wayimsettling and potentially dangerous." Such works are
"careless to instruct."^^ After all "it is always a writer's duty to make
the world better, and justice is a virtue independent of time or place,"
Johnson contends, and, sounding like an early New Historicist, not
even the primitive nature of his time can excuse the powerfully
exuberant imagination of Shakespeare.^® He is quick to praise KingLear
as "deservedly celebrated," a play with power to keep the attention
"strongly fixed," and "so powerful is the current of the poet's imagina
tion, that the mind, which once ventures within it, is hurried irresist
ibly along." While on the one hand, the "improbability of Lear's
conduct" must be reckoned with, yet "if we turn our thoughts upon the
barbarity and ignorance of the age to which this story is referred, it will
appear not so unlikely as while we estimate Lear's manners by our
own." Yet, on the other hand, the blinding of Gloucester "seems an act
too horrid to be endured in dramatic exhibition, and such as must
always compel the mind to relieve its distress by incredulity." It is clear
to Johnson that Shakespeare "well knew what would please the
audience for which he wrote." And while evil seems to run rampant,
there is "this important moral, that villainy is never at a stop, that
crimes lead to crimes, and at least terminate in ruin." Yet "Shakespeare
has suffered the virtue of Cordelia to perish in a just cause, contrary to
the natural ideas of justice," even at the expense of history." The
power of Macbeth is clear, yet "the passions are directed to their true
end. Lady Macbeth is merely detested; and though the courage of
Macbeth preserves some esteem, yet every reader rejoices at his fall.""
The moral dimension that nuances the Johnsonian demand for the
true story is often supplanted or even complemented by the religious.

^''Johnson on Shakespeare.
Damrosch, 223-24.
^'Johnson on Shakespeare, 7:71.
^Johnson on Shakespeare, 8:702-04.
'"Johnson on Shakespeare, 8:795
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Jean Hagstrum early on argued that "Principles of order arise usually
from philosophy, morality, and religion and tend to affect one's
conception of nature and reality" and he regarded Johnson as an
"unrelenting and a fervent Christian.'"** Chester Chapin comments that
"Johnson was not satisfied with evidence pointing up similarities
between the God of Nature and the God of the Bible. "What he wanted
was evidence to show that, of all possible modes of the God-man
relationship, the Christian revelation was in fact the one chosen by
God.'"*^ Johnson's most famous statement on his hesitancy about
religious or devotional poetry is in The Life of Waller where he contends
that "poetical devotion cannot often please" and that "the ideas of
Christian Theology are too simple for eloquence, too sacred for fiction,
and too majestic for ornament." Even more striking, given the thesis
of this paper, "Man admitted to implore the mercy of his Creator, and
plead the merits of his Redeemer, is already in a higher state than
poetry can confer.'"*^ Damrosch offers the interesting speculation that
the emerging genre of the novel, with its ring of the real, was most
congenial to Johnson. "Richardson's Clarissa," he writes, which
Johnson admired, "offered nearly everything that he expected from
tragedy: it is an affecting she-tragedy exhibiting deep understanding of
the recesses of the human heart; it is sufficiently 'domestic' to be
apprehended by every reader; it is moral and indeed religious in its
lesson.'"*'*
So how doesJohnson approach a "religious" poet like Milton? We
have already seen other aspects of his judgment—his unhappiness with
"irreverent combinations," "trifling fictions" mingled with "the most
awful and sacred truths'"*^ to the disrespect of the latter; his concern
that the predicament of Adam and Eve before the Fall was one with
which readers could not identify. But again the power of the work,
albeit the genius of the poet is, in Fix's phrase, distant and awesome,
transcends all other considerations. To begin, there is a broad fidelity
to the law of the true, the probable, experienced reality. Indeed, in

" Hagstrum, 65.
" Chester Chapin, The Religious Thought of Samuel]ohnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1968), 80.
"Johnson, Lives, 1:125-26.
•" Leopold Damrosch, Samuel Johnson and the Tragic Sense (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1972), 254-55.
"Johnson, Lives, 1:116.
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keeping with Aristotle, it has "compleateness," "mfegnfy of...design,"
"a beginning, middle, and an end." And it has few epic digressions, and
"superfluities so beautiful who would take away?". And those petulant
critics who would deny the heroism of Adam "because he was
overcome" perhaps forget that "success and virtue do not go necessarily
hand in hand," or that even "if success be necessary, Adam's deceiver
was at last crushed; Adam was restored to his Maker's favour and
therefore may securely resume his human rank.'"*^
Most important for Johnson and that which engaged him deeply
is its sublimity. "It contains the history of a miracle, of Creation and
Redemption." It displays God's power and mercy in a way that "the
problem is marvellous, and the marvellous is probable." And its
imiversality transcends all theological considerations of the pre-fall state
of original justice. "All mankind," he says, "will, through all ages, bear
the same relation to Adam and Eve, and must partake of that good and
evil which extend to themselves." The ancient epic writers might have
been humanists of the first order, great teachers of virtue, but Milton
as Christian heroic poet adds "precepts of justice" and of "mercy.
As with Shakespeare, so with Milton. There are intangible powers
that transcend rules, law, indeed even normal license. It is a genius
inexplicable, but again a distant genius that makes Milton such a
formidable figure for the reader, a genius to "astonish," "the power of
displaying the vast, illuminating the splendid, enforcing the awful,
darkening the gloomy, and aggravating the dreadful." His "delight was
to sport in the wide regions of possibility; reality was a scene too
narrow for his mind.'"'® Maybe many of us have been too glib in
making light of the oft-quoted Johnsonian remark about no one ever
wishing Paradise Lost longer than it is, about reading it as a duty not a
pleasure. There is something remarkable about Johnson's underlining
of the reality of literature, its ability to catch us up in its world. "We,"
he says, gathering us into his company, "read Milton for instruction,
retire harassed and overburdened, and look elsewherefor recreation;we
desert our master, and seek for companions.'""

•"Johnson, Lives, 1:125-26.
•"Johnson, Lives, 1:124-28.
•"Johnson, Lives, 1:127
•" Johnson, Z,JWJ, 1:132.
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Could it be that a dramatically different critic—William
Hazlitt—operating from a dramatically different point of view—profit
ed enormously from Johnson's evaluation of the two great British poets
in his comparison of the genius of each? "Milton took only a few
simple principles of character, and raised them to the utmost conceiv
able grandeur, and refined them from every base alloy. His imagina
tion, 'nigh sphered in Heaven', claimed kindred only with what he saw
from that height, and could raise to the same elevation with himself.
He sat retired and kept his state along, 'playing with wisdom', while
Shakespeare mingled with the crowd, and played the host, 'to make
society the sweeter welcome.'"'"
I want to close this essay with Johnson's view of Pope, and
especially his critique of two relatively less familiar poems, a critique
which illustrates very well his love of what I've been calling the true
story and his uneasiness with romantic aberrations. Johnson is, of
course, a fan of Pope; we remember his categorical "If Pope be not a
poet, where is poetry to be found?"'^ Or, "There is more dignity in the
knowledge of Dryden, and more certainty in that of Pope" or "Dryden
knew more of man in his general nature, and Pope in his local
manners.'"^ Yet, as always, he has reservations even about his favorites.
Compare his comments about Eloisa toAbelard ^nAElegy to the Memory
of an Unfortunate Lady, both of which seem, at least on first consider
ation, uncharacteristic of the poet. For Maynard Mack "they represent
an indulgence of sentiment uncommon in Pope's longer works."" And
Rebecca Ferguson finds them unique "in presenting a direct and
sustained engagement in emotion forging an empathy between the
reader and narrator."'''
Yet Johnson offers almost extravagant praise of Eloisa, "one of the
most happy productions of human wit." Tragic love, the struggle of
nature and grace, final and complete separation—hardly the ingredients
of a Johnsonian prize poem. From its eerie Gothic setting to the

® William Hazlitt, "On Shakespeare and Milton" in Criticism:The Major Texts, ed. W.Jackson
Bate (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 309.
Johnson, Lives, 2.344.
" Johnson, Lives, 2.323.
" Maynard Mack, Alexander Pope: A Life (New York; Norton, in association with Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1985), 312.
^RebeccaFerguson, The Unbalanced Mind:Pope andthe Rule of Passion (Philadelphia; University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 1.
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emotional intensity of Eloisa's continuing pleading—"No, make me
mistress to the man I love," for the "happy state! when souls each other
draw,/When love is liberty, and nature, law," for the fiend to "tear me
from my God!"—the poem is a passionate love story. We wonder why
Johnson praises it so highly. Is it again a matter of the "true story" that
is at the root of his judgment? "The heart naturally loves truth," he
assures his reader. "The adventures and misfortunes of this illustrious
pair are known from undisputed history," and "we regularly interest
ourselves most in the fortunes of those who most deserve our notice."
And citing additional evidence, he praises the aesthetic and moral
closure that minimizes any ambivalence and excessive reader identifica
tion. The fate, of Eloisa and Abelard "does not leave the mind in
hopeless dejection, for they both found quiet and consolation in
retirement and piety.
Damrosch suggests that "neither Eloisa nor
Pope is ever past reason." There are "turbulent emotions," to be sure,
he says, but "we come in late...at the moment when she is putting it
down on paper. Pope withdraws from the darkest implications of
Eloisa."''
There is no sign of such a resolution in the "Elegy." Johnson's
judgment is brief, terse, definitive. The poemsimply doesn't work very
well. Although there were attempts to identify the woman and her
story, there is no one so sharply defined as Eloisa. And it is her
anonymity—and that of her guardian, for that matter—that distresses
Johnson and, as Mack puts it, makes the story "at all points vague and
at some points inchoate." It is a "mood," a "sort of psychological
configuration.'"^ Is she an emblem, a symbol? Has the poet's imagina
tion taken the kinds of unwarranted liberties here that Johnson saw
Milton taking in Lycidas} And, worse again, has the tormented speaker
been so carried away that he applauds the lady for having committed
suicide for love—"Oh, ever beauteous, ever friendly! tell / Is it, in
heav'n, a crime for love too well?" Has he become her advocate, her
eulogist as she is denied burial in sacred ground? This woman, he says,
will, by virtue of her love, create her own holy ground, and "There the
first roses of the year shall blow."

'^Johnson, Lives, 2.333.
Leopold Damrosch, The Imaginative World of Alexander Pope, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987) 50.
^'Johnson, Lives, 2:319
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Johnson's most oft-quoted indictment of the poem is that it has
"drawn much attention by the illaudable singularity of treating suicide
with respect." Yet his objections, if possible, run even deeper than this
fairly predictable one. The "tale," he writes, "is not skillfully told; it is
not easy to discover the character of either the Lady or her Guardian."'^
She is a nondescript, someone without the name and structure of an
Eloisa. Not even Owen Rufhead's attempt to historicize the story
provides for her "any claim to praise, nor much to compassion." And
her guardian's actions seem praiseworthy as he tries "to direct his niece
till she should be able to direct herself."
Still the Lady doesn't fare well with Johnson. "She seems to have
been impatient, violent, and ungovernable." And, as for the poetry, it
"has not often been worse employed than in dignifying the amorous
fury of a raving girl."" No great Eloisan heroism, no great moral
struggle, she is clearly "past reason," and her story is obscure and
inconsistent. On the other hand,Johnson defers to the common reader
again in his approach to Pope's ingenuity in introducing preternatural
elements, "heathen deities," allegorical characters into his Rape of the
Lock. He answers those unhappy with the machinery of the poem by
finding it difficult to avoid "the praises which have been accumulated
on The Rape of the Lock by readers of every class from the critic to the
waiting-maid." Pope, says Johnson in discussing the curious spirits of
the poem, gave the "petty nation" "their first poetical existence," the
ultimate test of originality. Most important, in Pope's poem "New
things are made familiar and familiar things are made new."^° And, as
Lipking reminds us, Johnson again concurs with the common reader
and the bedrock of experienced reality in his comments on Gray's Elegy
in the Life of Gray. Johnson, says Lipking, "admits the lovely figure of
Gray into that greater 'us' in whom all of us share—whoever all of us
are." The common reader who loves the poem "is defined in opposi
tion to a hypothetical reader corrupted with prejudice, refined with
subtlety, and dogmatic with learning—that is, an enemy reader very
much like Gray himself."^'

Johnson, Lives, 2:326
" Johnson, Lives, 2:245-46
^ Johnson, Lives, 2:331-32.
" Lipking, 54.
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There are, of course, many more objects of Johnson's attention,
but we close our argument here. The remarks above are not so much
an attempt to cut new ground, a difficult order given the remarkable
quality of Johnson studies. They are simply a brief attempt to bring
perhaps a fresh emphasis to what many of us see in a great critic's
approach to poetry—a demand for a true poetry imdistorted by the
temptations of fanciful imagining and unchecked emotion; characters
and situations of range and importance; a morality evident in represen
tation of good and evil; and a general respect for the dictates of rehgion.

